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INTRODUCTION
With regard to the rapid credit growth in the Hungarian
banking sector during recent years, changes in banks’
liquidity risk exposure have so far received little attention.
1
Recently, however, some international organisations (IMF,
World Bank) have drawn attention to the fact that the
dynamic increase in bank credit, in addition to exacerbating
other risk exposures, may also increase liquidity risks.
2 The
concerns related to the liquidity position of banks are
primarily due to the fact that the role of more volatile,
foreign market financing has substantially increased, at the
expense of stable deposit funds in the financing of the
dynamically growing long-term loans. This shift in the
structure of funding sources may increase rollover risks, i.e.
banks’ funding becomes increasingly sensitive to
deterioration in risk perception, at both a bank (or banking
group) level and at the country level, as well as to
unfavourable changes in global liquidity conditions.
Another important aspect of the change in the funding
structure is the growing role of parent bank financing, which
is illustrated by the fact that, for some large banks, the ratio
of parent bank funds to liabilities amounts to 20 to 30
percent.
3 While intra-group funding is seen as beneficial for
increasing the efficiency of liquidity management and for
containing funding costs, it also increases the potential risk of
contagion within the group (ECB, 2006). In other words, a
spillover of problems incidentally arising within the group
may result in financing difficulties for those Hungarian banks
which substantially rely on parent company resources. That
explains the importance of examining the level of liquidity
stress banks can cope with on the basis of their own
resources, without resorting to parent bank support.
In assessing the liquidity risk of Hungarian banks, the
central bank has so far primarily relied on balance-sheet-
based indicators. As far as the changes in banks’ liquidity
risk exposures are concerned, recent analyses of balance-
sheet-based indicators have resulted in a mixed picture.
While the increasing role of foreign market funds has the
potential to raise funding volatility, the substantial increase
in the share of long-term foreign liabilities has reduced
rollover risks (MNB, 2007). However, traditional balance-
sheet-based indicators are, in themselves, insufficient for a
comprehensive assessment of risk exposure, as they leave
out of consideration contingency liquidity risk, which is an
important aspect of liquidity risk. Contingency liquidity risk
can be defined as the risk that the bank does not have
sufficient funds to fulfil its obligations due to a sudden and
substantial increase in its net funding requirements (Matz
and Neu, 2007). Contingency liquidity risk may be due, for
example, to a sudden, large withdrawal of deposits, an
outflow of interbank funds or unexpectedly large drawdown
For central banks, monitoring banks’ liquidity risk is of great importance from a financial stability perspective. One essential
gauge for assessing liquidity risk exposure is whether banks have sufficient liquidity buffers to survive a potential unexpected
funding crisis. In this article, we aim to assess the resilience of Hungarian banks to liquidity shocks by using a liquidity stress
test. The test is based on a hypothetical stress scenario involving a bank-specific liquidity shock, triggered by a confidence crisis,
for example. The shock absorbing capacity of a bank is measured by the maximum degree of liquidity shock the bank can
withstand over the short run on the strength of its liquid assets. On the basis of the results of the stress test it is believed that
the current liquidity risks essentially do not pose a threat to financial stability. As for large banks, with the overwhelming part
of customer deposits, the current liquidity buffers would typically enable the maintenance of liquidity even under extreme
circumstances. It should be noted, however, that Hungarian banks are increasingly exposed to fluctuations in global liquidity
and that intra-group financing relations may represent a contagion channel. Therefore, in the future, the study of these risk
scenarios may be important in further developing stress testing practices for both the central bank and commercial banks.
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1 For the purposes of this article, funding liquidity risk is the risk that the bank is either unable to fulfil its (short-term) payment obligations as they fall due or can only
fulfil them at the cost of a substantial profit loss. This is different from market liquidity risks, i.e. the risk that the bank is unable to dispose of its marketable assets
without incurring substantial losses, due to market disturbances.
2 See reports by the IMF (2007) and the World Bank (2007).
3 Funds from other members of the respective banking group are also included in parent bank funding, in addition to those directly obtained from the parent bank.of open credit lines. In order to measure this risk, a liquidity
stress test is employed on the basis of a hypothetical
scenario, according to which the loss of confidence in a
particular institution precipitates a substantial increase in
net funding requirements for the bank. The main objective
of the stress test is to assess the adequacy of Hungarian
banks’ liquidity buffers to withstand a potential funding
crisis.
A SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE LIQUIDITY
STRESS TESTS OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
In comparison with credit and market risk tests, liquidity
stress tests of the banking system are considerably less
widespread in the practice of central banks and the
international financial institutions (e.g. the IMF) (Cihák,
2007). This absence is partly due to the lack of established and
generally accepted concepts and modelling methods for
assessing the exposure to liquidity risks. In addition to the
above, the fact that the available regulatory reports are
considerably less detailed than banks’ internal risk reports,
presents another problem for the authorities.
4 As far as the
definitions of liquidity risk are concerned, liquidity stress tests
tend to focus on the ability to fulfil payment obligations rather
than the impact on profitability.
5 The liquidity stress tests of
the banking system typically employ hypothetical scenarios to
assess banks’ resilience to liquidity shocks. Based on balance
sheet data, the simpler methods examine the potential change
in the liquid asset ratio of a bank in the wake of a presumed
liquidity shock (e.g. a substantial deposit withdrawal).
6
More complex liquidity stress tests, however, require the
availability of data on the cash-flow-based maturity gap. In
maturity tables, cash flows from assets, liabilities, off-balance
sheet items, income and expenses are classified into maturity
bands on the basis of contractual maturity. The maturity gap
is the difference between cash inflows and cash outflows
pertaining to the specific maturity bands. The typical
hypothesis in maturity gap-based stress tests is that a
substantial volume of customer deposits and/or interbank
funds are withdrawn or that the markets of liquefiable
securities become illiquid over a short period (e.g. one week
to one month). In addition to the above, some banking
system-wide liquidity stress tests also consider the possibility
of interbank contagion. In maturity gap-based stress tests,
there are two typical ways of quantifying banks’ shock
absorbing capacity:
7
• the change, during a specific period, of the maturity gap or
the liquid assets/maturity gap ratio following the liquidity
shock compared to a normal scenario, and
• the length of time (‘survival’ period) during which the bank
is able to maintain its liquidity after the outbreak of the
liquidity crisis.
Considering both the methodological overview and data
availability, we have employed the maturity gap-based
approach, since it enables the ‘shocking’ of the liquidity
position of a given bank for multiple variables. Due to their
significant potential impact on liquidity risk and in addition
to cash flows from assets and liabilities, we have also taken
into consideration potential cash flows from contingent
liabilities. The measure of shock absorbing capacity is
identified on the basis of the maximum increase in funding
requirements the bank is able to satisfy with its own liquidity
reserves. In devising the stress scenarios, we have drawn on
international and Hungarian experience on individual bank-
level stress test practices.
DESCRIPTION OF THE STRESS SCENARIO
AND THE MAIN ASSUMPTIONS
The starting point for the stress scenario is a bank-specific
liquidity shock, e.g. triggered by a confidence crisis.
8
Accordingly, in the stress scenario it is assumed that a part of
customer deposits and money market funds are withdrawn,
in order to examine the level of liquidity shock the bank is
able to survive on the strength of its own resources. The
impact of the stress scenario on liquidity is measured over
one-week and one-month intervals. As for the group of banks
under review, it should be noted that mortgage banks,
building societies and the “head bank” of cooperative banks
have been excluded from the analysis due to the special
composition of their liabilities.
Stress coefficients have been specified for cash inflows and
cash outflows and liquid assets. For cash flows linked to
assets and liabilities, the stress coefficients are an indication
of the expected rate of rollover of the assets and liabilities in
question under a specific risk scenario. For liquid securities,
the stress coefficient reveals the level of haircut at which they
can be disposed of in a stress situation or at which additional
funds can be acquired by secured borrowing. The haircut
used for Hungarian government securities has been adjusted
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4 For that reason, in several cases, banks perform the stress tests on their own set of data, according to the scenarios provided by the regulatory bodies.
5 In that sense, the focus is exclusively on the downside risk, as compared to the profit and loss impact, where risks are two-sided (due to too low or too high liquidity).
6The use of these simpler methods may be justified by restrictions in the set of available data (e.g. the lack of a maturity table).
7 Under both approaches it is assumed that the bank cannot resort to any external liquidity support.
8The bank-specific liquidity shock (withdrawal of customer and interbank funds) may be the result of actual or presumed credit losses, of a (two- or three-notch)
downgrading in credit ratings or of the loss of reputation due to other reasons.to values used in the MNB’s collateral management, whereas
conservative estimates were used for other items.
One of the important aspects of the stress scenario concerns
the possible assumptions related to the granting of new
customer loans (or the rollover of maturing loans). On the
basis of international banking practices, it is assumed that
banks make an effort to roll over maturing customer loans.
However, in a crisis situation, the rollover of maturing loans
is probably impossible to achieve in full measure, and the
renewal rate may substantially vary by customer groups and
types of loan. Since the cash flows linked to the various loans
are only available in an aggregated form, a distinction can be
made between bank overdrafts and other loans (with
maturities).
10 In defining the stress coefficient it has been
assumed that bank overdrafts are automatically rolled over,
i.e. they are not paid back during the crisis period. Our
assumptions concerning the loan renewal rate can be
considered conservative as, at the level of the banking system,
bank overdrafts account for 70 to 80 percent of loans
maturing within one month. Table 1 contains a summary of
the stress coefficients concerning cash inflows and liquid
assets.
For cash outflows, it has been assumed that non-deposit
liabilities maturing within 1 week or 1 month (e.g. interbank
funds) are not rolled over, as they are highly sensitive to the
worsening of risk assessment by market participants.
11 As the
stress test examines the shock absorbing capacity of banks on
a stand-alone basis, one important assumption is that
potential parent bank assistance (or the rollover of parent
bank funds) is not taken into consideration. As far as off-
balance sheet items are concerned, with regard to guarantees,
those expected to be drawn down are included, while with
regard to credit lines, the actually reported amount or 5
percent (1 week) and 15 percent (1 month) of the full amount
have been taken into consideration.
12 Table 2 contains a
summary of the stress coefficients concerning cash outflows. 
Resilience of banks to liquidity shocks is measured by
comparing the one-week and one-month maturity gaps
calculated through the assumption of the stress scenario with
the customer funds. That indicator (‘liquidity stress
indicator’) indicates the maximum rate of withdrawal of
customer funds a bank is able to pay out, provided that it is
unable to obtain new funds on the unsecured money market.
Finally, a few restricting assumptions must be mentioned
before the presentation of the stress test results:
• Since the maturity structure is unavailable at a consolidated
level or in a currency breakdown, the results are based on
‘unconsolidated’ and total (HUF + foreign currency) data.
However, with regard to the substitutability between
various currencies (due to well-developed FX swap
markets), the importance of the lack of a currency
breakdown was not considered significant.
•  Since no maturity breakdown is available for the off-
balance sheet items related to derivative transactions, the
impact on liquidity of these transactions cannot be
accounted for in the analysis.
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Cash and settlement accounts Total stock 100%
Hungarian governement securities and central bank bonds Total stock 98%
EMU government securities Total stock 95%
Listed shares Total stock 90%
Central bank and interbank deposits Maturing within 1 week/1 month 100%
Customer loans (excl. overdrafts) Maturing within 1 week/1 month 100%
Overdrafts 0%
Other assets Maturing within 1 week/1 month 80%
Income (interest, fee, etc.) Due within 1 week/1 month 80%
Table 1
Stress coefficients concerning cash inflows and liquid assets
9
9 For cash inflows, higher stress coefficients indicate higher probability of cash flows incoming.
10 Information on bank overdrafts is available from balance sheet data. It is assumed that all bank overdrafts are in the 0-7-day maturity band. If the amount of bank
overdrafts was lower than the amount of loans falling into the 0-7-day maturity band, the data were adjusted accordingly.
11 It should be noted that the deposits held by money market funds have been eliminated from interbank funds, as they typically fall into the group of customer funds
collected by the banking group.
12The latter adjustment was necessary because of reporting errors by some banks.•  In our stress test, we do not intend to investigate any
contagion effect, which could have a significant impact on
the substitutability between the forint and foreign
currencies (swap market), amongst other things.
STRESS TEST RESULTS
The results of the liquidity stress test indicate the overall low
liquidity risk exposure of Hungarian banks. While the
‘liquidity stress indicator’ varied widely for banks included in
the analysis, the average rate was over 20 percent and 25
percent, respectively, over the one-week and one-month time
horizons for all periods (Figure 1). The typically lower value
of the one-week stress indicators is partly due to the fact that,
up to the end of 2006, central bank deposits maturing
between 1 and 2 weeks were not available for short-term
management of a potential liquidity shock.
14
The distribution of the ‘liquidity stress indicators’ of
systemically important large banks was separately studied, as
these banks control around 80 percent of all deposits in the
banking system.
15 While for the seven largest banks, the
average value of the stress indicators is somewhat lower than
the banking sector average, it still exceeds 20 percent over
the one-week time horizon and reaches 25 percent over the
one-month time horizon (Figure 2). At the dates examined,
the minimum of the one-week ‘liquidity stress indicator’ for
large banks was relatively volatile but it still remained above
10 percent. 
The fact that no suitable benchmark is available for our
‘liquidity stress indicator’ renders the interpretation of the
results of the stress test more difficult. It should also be noted
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Interbank liabilities (deposits) Maturing within 1 week/1 month 100%
Interbank and other borrowed funds (loans) Maturing within 1 week/1 month 100%
Debt securities Maturing within 1 week/1 month 100%
Subordinated liabilities Maturing within 1 week/1 month 100%
Other liabilities Maturing within 1 week/1 month 100%
Expenses (interest, fee, operating costs, etc.) Due within 1 week/1 month 100%
Guarantees Due to be paid within 1 week/1 month 100%
Either: due to be drawn within 1 week/1 month 100%
Undrawn part of credit lines or: (1 week) total stock  5%
and (1 month) total stock  15%
Table 2
Stress coefficients concerning cash outflows (excl. customer deposits)
13
13 For liabilities, the 100-percent stress coefficient indicates that the respective liabilities are not rolled over.
14 However, following the replacement of the two-week central bank deposit by a central bank bond from early 2007, this instrument has theoretically also become
immediately available for the bridging of a potential liquidity problem.
15 For the purposes of this article, systemically important banks are those with significant market shares in deposit markets.
Figure 1
Average one-week and one-month ‘liquidity stress
indicator’of the banks included in the analysis” 
Dec. 04 Dec. 05 Dec. 06 May 07











Distribution of one-week and one-month ‘liquidity






























Per centthat the comparability of the results between various banks is
also limited, partly because of the differences in business
models (and financing patterns), even within the relatively
homogeneous group of large banks. However, on the basis of
the international experiences of banking stress test practices
and historical experience of bank runs in Hungary, we
believe that our assumptions can be considered to be
conservative. According to the survey of Joint Forum (2006),
in crisis scenarios, banks typically assume a withdrawal level
lower than 10 percent for ‘retail’ deposits within a month,
due primarily to the role of deposit insurance.
16 This is not
contradicted by the Hungarian experience of bank liquidity
crisis episodes as, in the case of Postabank, the withdrawal of
customer funds at a level close to 20 percent essentially
affected security-type liabilities not covered by deposit
insurance.
Moreover, according to the Joint Forum survey, for
wholesale (corporate, bank, government) deposits, banks
presume a withdrawal rate of 20 to 50 percent at worst,
where the lower and higher values refer to corporate and
interbank deposits respectively. In our stress scenario,
however, we calculated using a 100-percent outflow of
interbank funds. With regard to the fact that our stress
scenario also considers potential cash outflows due to
contingent liabilities, our hypothetical scenario can be
considered as rather extreme. Taking this into account, it is
considered that, the average one-week and one-month “stress
indicators”, at 25 percent in May 2007, for systemically
important banks are high. However, it should also be taken
into account that the minimum of the liquidity stress
indicator for large banks is considerably below the group
average.
Two important factors should be mentioned that explain the
typically high liquidity shock absorbing capacity of large
Hungarian banks. First, the Hungarian banking system still
has a substantial structural surplus liquidity, which increases
the available buffer for containing potential shocks, the
degree of which may vary from bank to bank. It should also
be emphasised that, in recent years, banks have made
significant efforts to obtain funds with longer maturities
(over one year) for financing the rapid growth in lending.
This is reflected in the maturity breakdown of foreign market
funds of large banks, accounting for the overwhelming part
of lending activities. In parallel with the brisk increase of
long-term foreign-currency loans, the ratio of long-term
foreign interbank funds and bonds to liabilities increased
steadily and, by the end of 2006, its share was 15 percent as
compared to the 6-percent ratio of short-term foreign
interbank funds (Figure 3). Altogether, the transformation of
the funding structure of banks has so far not been
accompanied by a significant increase of rollover risks.
17
CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of the results of the stress test performed for
Hungarian banks, it is believed that the current liquidity risks
essentially do not pose a threat to financial stability. The
shock absorbing capacity of large banks, controlling the
overwhelming majority of deposits, is generally high, but
even that of lower-liquidity banks can be regarded adequate.
Our conclusions are corroborated by the fact that the
possibility of parent bank assistance has been disregarded in
the tests, as they were designed to assess the resilience of
Hungarian banks to shocks on a stand-alone basis.
18 The high
liquidity shock absorbing capacity is partly due to the fact
that, in parallel with the rapid increase in long-term lending,
banks have been able to substantially lengthen the average
maturity of their liabilities. In addition to that, substantial
structural surplus liquidity has remained in the Hungarian
banking system, which increases the reserves available in
order to survive potential liquidity shocks.
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Figure 3
Foreign market financing sources of large banks
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16The Joint Forum is common forum of the international associations of financial regulators (BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS) in the banking, securities and insurance sectors.
17This analysis does not concern the profitability risks related to the change in the funding structure. It should be noted, however, that the profitability risk has increased
at a higher rate than the renewal risk, since foreign interbank funds of a maturity over 12 months bear interests at variable rates and typically have a short re-pricing
period.
18 As referred to above, one of the reasons behind disregarding potential parent bank assistance is the possibility that an individual shock may ultimately be the result of
parent bank problems.On the assessment of the results, the fact that our stress test
was restricted to the investigation of the impact of a bank-
specific scenario should also be taken into consideration. One
of the possible directions of the further development of stress
test practices could be the examination of the impact of other
risk scenarios on the liquidity of banks. Of these risk factors,
the more in-depth analysis of the risks arising as a result of
the potential tightening of global liquidity and of intra-group
financing relations may be of primary importance. There are
two reasons that seem to require giving increased
consideration to group-level contagion risks. First, since
some large foreign-controlled banks rely on parent bank
financing to a substantial extent, shocks affecting the parent
bank or other group members may generate serious liquidity
problems for their Hungarian affiliates. Similarly, for
Hungarian banks following an active international expansion
strategy, negative shocks affecting their subsidiaries can have
a significant impact on the liquidity of parent banks. 
With regard to the above risk factors, it may prove useful for
banks to regularly perform liquidity stress tests taking into
consideration the specific features of their operations. While
there has been considerable progress in this area in recent
years, stress tests becoming an even more established
standard risk assessment tool would certainly supportive of
stability. The practices employed in order to measure the
ability to withstand shocks under extreme circumstances
serve practical purposes (Matz and Neu, 2007). First,
measuring the level of preparedness for the management of
extraordinary situations may reveal potential (hidden)
liquidity problems. On the other hand, stress tests should be
integrated into the risk management practices of the bank,
e.g. by taking their results into consideration on reviewing
risk limits or contingency plans.
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